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Introduction 
Belgium exercised the presidency of the 
Council of the European Union for the 12th 
time in the second half of 2010. It was 
obvious to an even superficial observer that 
this experience would again be completely 
different from all the previous times. With 
the introduction of the new Lisbon Treaty 
came indeed a transitional period in which 
new power relationships and balances had to 
be found, moreover in a very difficult 
situation of economic and monetary crisis. 
The efficient implementation of the new 
treaty and the fight against the financial and 
economic crisis were the two main threads 
running through the Belgian EU presidency 
programme. 
Having been involved very closely at 
headquarters level in the preparation and 
conduct of the EU presidency by Belgium, 
this contribution contains a personal analysis 
of how the EU presidency “new style” was 
working and of some likely trends in the 
future. Since then several detailed studies 
have been published at academic level, most 
often however based on extensive interviews 
with the principal actors.1 
                                                 
1 Two major publications are: VAN HECKE, S. 
and BURSENS, P. (eds.), Readjusting the Council 
Presidency - Belgian leadership in the EU, ASP, 
Brussels, 2011, 288 p.; Res Publica, Themanummer: 
In this Policy Brief, Belgian 
diplomat Willem Van de Voorde 
offers his hands-on view on the 
Belgian EU-Presidency in 2010; 
including the key lessons of this 
post-Lisbon Treaty “new style” 
rotating presidency. He argues that 
despite the major implications of 
the Lisbon Treaty, notably the new 
permanent President of the 
European Council, the rotating 
presidency can still play a central 
role in the EU decision-making 
process. 
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Although an EU presidency also presents a 
huge logistical and financial challenge for a 
Member state, the main emphasis of this 
Policy Brief is on the preparation and the 
implementation of the programme. 
The incoming Belgian presidency operated 
during an institutional transition phase in 
which significant new functions or 
procedures of the European Union were 
applied for the first time. On top of that the 
Belgian government fell in April 2010 and 
entered in a very long period of current 
affairs. Although the initial expectations were 
somewhat tempered by these challenging 
circumstances, the members of the Belgian 
government and their staff felt from the 
beginning of their term that they enjoyed the 
full confidence of their European partners. 
These told us openly that the experienced, 
proactive, Europe-friendly Belgian 
government system was actually ideally 
placed to steer the EU through this delicate 
transitional period, which was moreover 
suffering under the worst economic crisis 
since World War II. 
Priorities of the Belgian EU Presidency 
As a result of the dizzying growth of 
European action in the past twenty years, the 
coordination of an EU presidency 
programme has become a very complex and 
comprehensive activity. During an inventory 
exercise in the final stage of the preparation, 
approximately 500 subjects or legislative 
proposals under discussion (though of 
varying importance) were found, covering all 
council formations and subordinate working 
groups. Some 200 subjects were eventually 
mentioned in the official Belgian presidency 
                                                                        
Belgisch EU-voorzitterschap, Vol. 53 (2011/3), pp. 
269-362. 
programme.2 In order to present and grasp 
the multitude of issues at stake, the 
programme was structured around 5 major 
clusters of themes, to which was added a 
horizontal cluster of issues associated with 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.  
The fight against the financial and 
economic crisis and the strengthening of 
European economic governance was without 
doubt the most important cluster, both in the 
planning phase and later in the table of 
results. 
The second major area of activity involved 
foreign relations. It concerned not so much 
the traditional European Common Foreign 
and Security Policy which had come under 
the auspices of the High Representative since 
1 December 2009, but rather external trade 
policy and enlargement negotiations. 
The cluster climate, environment and 
energy was a third important axis. In the 
second half of 2010 two major international 
conferences were scheduled, where the 
Belgian presidency was responsible for 
coordinating the European position and its 
negotiation on site: the 10th Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity 
in Nagoya (Japan) between 18 and 29 
October 2010 and the 16th Conference of 
the Parties to the International Climate 
Conference3 in Cancun (Mexico). 
The strengthening of the social dimension 
of the EU was the fourth major field of 
action.  
                                                 
2 See the website of the Belgian Federal Parliament. 
3 United Nations Framework Conference on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
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A fifth major thematic cluster was built 
around the vast area of justice, home 
affairs, asylum and immigration.  
A final cluster of issues concerned a number 
of diverse and important measures to 
implement the Lisbon Treaty, such as the 
creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the citizens’ initiative and 
the European budget for 2011. 
Evaluation of the Belgian EU Presidency 
The overall evaluation of the Belgian EU 
presidency was very positive and this was not 
only due to the somewhat tempered 
expectations by the end of June 2010 as a 
result of the difficult government formation 
in Belgium. Both the domestic and foreign 
media praised in particular the seriousness, 
the perseverance, the professionalism of the 
Belgian presidency and the high number of 
concrete results, all related to the EU agenda. 
A calculation of the Council Secretariat 
shows that in the second half of 2010 an 
agreement was found between the Council 
and the European Parliament on 39 
legislative texts.4 Some 15 other important 
but non-legislative decisions, conclusions or 
realizations could be added to that. 
 In his closing speech to the European 
Parliament on 18 January 2011, Prime 
Minister Yves Leterme concluded that the 
EU and the Lisbon Treaty “worked well”.5 In 
his opinion, the following factors of success 
were relevant: first, the deliberate choice of 
the Belgian government(s) to focus on 
completing a European rather than a national 
                                                 
4 Consilium, Dossiers en codécision clôturés après 
l'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'Amsterdam.  
5 LETERME, Y., Concluding speech before the 
European Parliament, 18 January 2011. 
agenda. This also means that the different 
chairmen pursued the role of “honest 
broker”, aiming at a favourable European 
negotiation result by implementing the 
European agenda (which is largely inherited 
from previous presidencies), while keeping a 
certain distance from the national position. A 
second factor of success was the option to 
use right from the beginning all the 
opportunities of the new Lisbon Treaty, to 
keep the transition periods, which are 
sometimes unavoidable, as short as possible 
and to give full political space to the new 
actors of the Lisbon Treaty, namely Herman 
Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton. 
Finally, one may add some famous Belgian 
negotiating attitudes that bear fruit in the 
complex European context: compromise 
oriented pragmatism, patient perseverance 
and cooperative listening capacity. 
First experiences with the EU Presidency 
“new style”  
The Lisbon Treaty has undoubtedly had a 
major influence on how Member States have 
exercised the EU presidency from 2010. It is 
obviously still too early for definitive or 
thorough evaluations. Yet three things are 
already clearly visible: first, the rotating 
presidency keeps a central place in the 
European decision-making process, whatever 
some observers may have said ; second, the 
management of the European agenda has not 
become easier, rather on the contrary ; and 
finally, Belgium has from the beginning of 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
used the chance to prove that the complex 
governance of the Lisbon European treaties 
can work and produce results provided a 
number of constructive attitudes are present.  
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Nine out of ten council formations remain 
completely under the responsibility of the 
rotating presidency, i.e. from working group 
to ministerial level. The presidency of the 
European Council has become permanent, 
but almost all its subordinate preparatory 
bodies remain in the hands of the rotating 
presidency: the General Affairs Council, 
COREPER, and most of the underlying 
working groups. The biggest change has 
occurred in the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, where most bodies have 
been given a permanent president, with the 
High Representative at the top of the 
pyramid. The Lisbon Treaty has in the end 
not resolved the struggle6 between supporters 
and opponents of a rotating presidency and 
we have to live now with a hybrid system. 
Both configurations have advantages and 
disadvantages. After nearly ten years of 
intense negotiations and debate, one can only 
conclude that the European "constitutional” 
legislators have deliberately chosen for a 
rather ambiguous system. Practice will prove 
whether this system works and whether the 
success of the Belgian presidency in 2010 was 
exceptional or whether it is fit for emulation. 
The following sections address specific key 
issues of the practice of the EU Presidency 
under the Lisbon Treaty. 
Increasing complexity requires a new 
form of cooperative federalism 
As mentioned above, in a number of council 
formations the vertical "chain of command" 
has been broken: the Foreign Affairs 
Council, the European Council and, 
                                                 
6 VAN de VOORDE, W., Plädoyer für das 
Rotationsverfahren in der Ratspräsidentschaft der 
Europäischen Union, Integration, 25. Jahrgang, 
Oktober 2002, p. 318-325. 
previously, the Eurogroup/ECOFIN 
Council.7 Compared with the situation now, 
the presidency of the European Council 
seems to have been a simple matter in the 
past: the Prime Minister of the Member State 
holding the presidency set the agenda and 
was able to steer his ministers and the 
underlying working groups in the desired 
direction through their national government 
work. The same was true when themes of 
foreign policy were involved. Since 2010, 
however, this practice belongs to the past: 
the President of the European Council sets 
the agenda for its meetings, albeit in 
consultation with the rotating presidency and 
probably also in consultation with the High 
Representative (the rules of procedure do not 
formally require the latter consultation).8 The 
Belgian EU presidency has demonstrated that 
this complex collaboration can work, 
provided additional consultation procedures 
are maintained. The Treaty of Lisbon rightly 
wanted more continuity and top down 
impulses to the Council and the creation of 
permanent chairmen was a logical answer to 
these needs. But this gain has a downside, 
because the complexity of decision-making 
has increased, and the new treaty has not 
provided specific consultation or arbitration 
processes. One of the major challenges of the 
Belgian presidency was to organize for the 
first time systematic consultations between 
the rotating presidency, the High 
Representative and the Presidents of the 
                                                 
7 To the Eurogroup belong the ministers of finance 
of the eurozone and they form an informal meeting 
of ministers separate from the ECOFIN council to 
which they also belong.  The Eurogroup was 
formally acknowledged in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
played a key role during the crisis years of 2009-
2010. 
8 Rules of Procedure of the European Council: 
Official Journal of the EU, L, 2009, nr. 315,  p.51-
55.  
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European Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament, at both the administrative 
(Permanent Representative, Secretary 
General) and the political level.  
The Belgian presidency was eager to maintain 
regular contacts with the leading persons of 
all major European institutions in order to 
follow-up and handle smoothly the key issues 
on the negotiating table. These meetings were 
essential in shaping the governance of a 
renewed and more complex EU. Sometimes 
the rotating presidency played the role of 
moderator by bringing together actors who 
would otherwise hardly talk to each other. 
Deputy Prime Minister Steven Vanackere, 
Chairman of the General Affairs Council in 
the second half of 2010, at his final news 
conference on 20 December 2010 strikingly 
compared the new EU presidency with the 
differential in a car: this is not an additional 
wheel of the car but a mechanism to 
coordinate the smooth running of the four 
existing wheels of a car9. The role of the 
national Prime Minister has been formally 
reduced and he receives much less visibility, 
but it turned out that he continues to play an 
important role behind the scenes as 
coordinator of his own government team; 
thanks to targeted contacts with the 
presidents of the Commission or the 
European Parliament he was able to 
intervene helpfully in specific cases. It is now 
the challenge for the next rotating 
presidencies to further develop this 
moderating role between the different 
permanent presidents, with respect for the 
respective competences of each. In so doing 
a more structured dialogue between the 
institutions may arise, in addition to the 
already well-established negotiations between 
                                                 
9 See the website of the Belgian EU-presidency. 
Council, Commission and Parliament, i.e. the 
traditional role of the presidency. It is 
therefore no exaggeration to say that the 
Treaty of Lisbon has established for the first 
time a promising but demanding new kind of 
cooperative federalism. 
Greater attention is required for the 
increased role of the European 
Parliament  
The legislative and supervisory role of the 
European Parliament (EP) has been 
substantially expanded by the Lisbon Treaty, 
requiring a different approach by the rotating 
presidency. It is sufficiently known that the 
“ordinary legislative procedure”10(the former 
“co-decision”, based on qualified majority 
voting in the Council) has become the 
normal rule for the legislative work in the 
EU, exactly as the name suggests. Less 
known is that the Lisbon Treaty has caused a 
revolution in the voting procedure of the 
annual budget. Council and Parliament are 
now equally responsible for the adoption of 
the annual budget, whereas the European 
Parliament previously used to play a minor 
role. This change not only made the 
discussion of the annual budget of the EU 
for 2011 much more difficult, but its effect 
was also immediately felt in unrelated areas 
that have however budgetary implications. 
Discussions in 2010 between the Council and 
the Parliament on the establishment of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
were a good example of this trend. The 
European Parliament could only give an 
opinion on the basic act, a Council decision 
of 26 July 2010.11 This decision, however, 
                                                 
10 Art. 294  TFEU. 
11 Official Journal of the EU, L, 2010, nr. 201, p. 
30-40.  
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could only be applied after the approval of an 
amendment to the financial regulation (which 
gives the EEAS the status of a separate entity 
with budgetary autonomy) and of an 
amendment to the staff regulations of the 
European civil servants. These two 
complementary but necessary decisions were 
subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, 
giving the European Parliament as much 
power as the Council. Moreover, the EEAS 
needed an operating budget from the 1 
December 2010, its official start of 
operations, requiring an amendment to the 
2010 budget and to the budgetary procedure 
2011 that had already had been started. For 
both budget amending procedures the 
approval of Parliament was required. 
From the beginning of 2010 it became clear 
that the European Parliament would consider 
all the elements for establishing the EEAS as 
a single package, thereby circumventing its 
limited participation in the decision of the 
basic act. In so doing it hoped to increase the 
influence of the Commission and its own 
controlling functions of the EEAS. On 21 
June 2010, in the last days of the Spanish 
presidency, the Council, the High 
Representative, the Commission and the 
European Parliament reached a political 
agreement on the basic parameters and 
procedures of the EEAS and on 26 July 2010 
the Council approved the basic act. The 
additional decisions (staff regulations, 
financial regulation and budgetary 
amendments) were finally agreed in early 
November, after rather difficult negotiations 
with the EP. 
This is in fact an example of a rather unusual 
negotiation. The conduct of negotiations in 
the ordinary legislative procedure is probably 
more relevant: here the negotiations between 
the Council and the Parliament in several 
cases proved to be very arduous and time-
consuming. The conduct of these discussions 
nowadays is one of the most important tasks 
of a presidency. Many observers still think a 
presidency essentially means presiding 
meetings of ministers or civil servants in the 
framework of the Council, but that role has 
been substantially expanded with a 
parliamentary dimension since the 
introduction of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Gradually, the presidency has had to adapt to 
a certain degree of unpredictability in the 
political negotiations with the Parliament: it 
may well chair and organize the Council 
work, but it has no say in the decision-
making process or the organization of the 
work of the Parliament. It can only try to 
optimize the mutual cooperation by setting 
up a relation of confidence with the key 
members of the EP. That is exactly what the 
Belgian EU presidency has aimed to do from 
the preparatory phase of the presidency 
onwards. 
The necessary preparations were made well in 
advance: the parliamentary cell in the 
Permanent Representation was strengthened; 
the State Secretary for European Affairs, 
Olivier Chastel, undertook extensive rounds 
of preparatory contacts with key members of 
the EP; and finally, timely and well-prepared 
individual contacts were established in the 
last days before the beginning of the 
presidency term between all the responsible 
ministers and officials and their counterparts 
in the European Parliament. All incoming 
presidencies will have to pay careful attention 
to this dimension from now onwards. 
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Reduced visibility as a political price for 
more consistency and uniqueness 
The reduction of the political visibility for the 
rotating presidency in the field of external 
relations is a remarkable side effect of the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: 
according to the Treaty (Article 15 TEU), the 
President of the European Council “shall, at 
his level and in that capacity, ensure the 
external representation of the Union on 
issues concerning its common foreign and 
security policy, without prejudice to the 
powers of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy”. The introduction of this principle is 
considered one of the major achievements of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Some aspects of this 
principle were felt in practice rather soon, 
such as the President's responsibility for the 
organization of summits with foreign heads 
of government. It is understandable that this 
change initially caused a certain confusion 
about the respective roles of the President of 
the European Council and e.g. the Spanish 
Prime Minister in the preparation of the EU-
US summit, which was initially foreseen in 
Madrid in February 2010 (it was eventually 
cancelled). But what are the implications of 
this new approach in the longer term? What 
are the effects on third countries or on the 
perception of the EU by third countries? 
What are the effects on the effectiveness of 
European foreign policy, supposing this is 
measurable? What are the effects on the role 
of the national diplomacies of Member 
States? The consequences are potentially 
wide ranging, but it is still too early to make 
accurate estimations.  
A complaint one often hears is that the new 
system negatively affects the “ownership” of 
the Member States in matters of foreign 
relations. Member States would not only 
loose the direct contact with foreign affairs, 
but also gradually lose their interest in it. This 
evolution – if it is true – would be deplorable 
for the European institutions, because they 
need a continuous interest of the Member 
States in order not to act in a vacuum. There 
is no simple recipe to make up for this 
potential loss of interest: all players will have 
to recognize that the gain in coherence and 
unity (one of the objectives of the Lisbon 
Treaty) carries the price of a reduced 
ownership of the Member States involved. 
But this need not be the end of the story. 
The new permanent chairmen of the 
geographical Council working groups (which 
now no longer fall under the rotating 
presidency, but are presided by an official of 
the EEAS) will have to be aware of this need 
and will have to develop mechanisms in 
order to generate the interest of the Member 
States and to keep their feeling of ownership 
as intact as possible. This obviously applies 
equally to Baroness Ashton and to the new 
permanent President of the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). The Member 
States, on the other hand, will have to resist 
“abdicating”, should remain active at every 
level of the decision-making process and 
should continue to think along with the 
presidency, in order to provide it with 
impulses. 
In the second half of 2010 two major 
summits took place: the ASEM summit in 
Brussels on 4-5 October and the EU-Africa 
Summit on 29-30 November in Tripoli. In 
addition, eight bilateral summits between the 
EU and third countries were held.12 
                                                 
12 With Russia, the US, Brazil, South-Africa, China, 
India and South-Korea. Apart from the summits 
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According to the new treaty, Herman Van 
Rompuy chaired these summits, even though 
he had to rely largely on the preparatory work 
by the Belgian EU presidency, given the 
transitional arrangements that were still valid 
at that time. The Belgian Prime Minister Yves 
Leterme was hosting the ASEM Summit in 
Brussels and this offered him of course a 
certain visibility, but the agenda was fixed by 
Van Rompuy and he led the discussions. For 
subsequent presidencies, which are not so 
lucky to have their national capital coincide 
with the European capital, it will be harder to 
accept this change. 
A stronger top-down steering process, 
created and consolidated in times of 
crisis 
Above it was stated that the role of the 
rotating presidency remains substantial, as it 
stays in the driving seat in nine out of ten 
council formations. At the same time it is 
obvious that top-down driving forces have 
gained significantly in importance – exactly 
what the authors of the Lisbon Treaty 
wanted in the context of an ever growing and 
diversifying EU. This transformation 
happened at a vulnerable and crucial moment 
in European history, amid an economic and 
financial crisis that shook the foundations of 
achievements such as the euro or the 
European social and economic model that 
were supposed to be unassailable. Suddenly, 
the President of the European Council 
received the opportunity to demonstrate how 
this permanent function, looking far beyond 
the limited 6-month time horizon of the 
traditional presidency, could give an added 
value to the new governance of the EU. By 
                                                                        
with Brazil and the US, they all took place in 
Brussels. 
introducing continuity, trust and experience 
at the top of the EU, his role cannot be 
overestimated in bringing on track, together 
with Commission President Barroso, the new 
Europe 2020 Strategy for Growth and Jobs, 
or in defining a more integrated European 
economic governance,13 or in the rescue 
plans for Greece and Ireland, and thus also 
for the Eurozone. For her part the High 
Representative, after difficult initial months, 
gradually managed to catch the attention of 
the Member States to reassess, for instance, 
the relations between the EU and its 
“strategic partners” and succeeded in 
developing her role as principle point of 
contact for the EU in the Middle East Peace 
Process. Such processes take a lot of time, 
top-down leadership and perseverance, and 
could never be developed efficiently by 
rotating presidencies. 
The stronger guiding role from the top can 
also be derived from a notable trend in 2010 
to shorten the conclusions of the European 
Council, particularly in the field of external 
relations: rather than undergoing time-
consuming discussions about public texts 
that considerably restrain their negotiating 
margins, the Presidents of the European 
Council and the Commission chose for more 
freedom by proposing brief conclusions, 
allowing them more bargaining room in their 
contacts with leaders of third countries.  
                                                 
13 Another permanent president played an 
important role in this context: under the 
chairmanship of Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
Eurogroup prepared e.g. the budgetary rescue 
operations for Ireland and Greece and designed the 
main characteristics of the future European 
financial Stability Facility (EFSF): declaration of the 
Eurogroup of 28 November 2010. 
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Conclusion  
In conclusion one may say that the driving 
role of new permanent presidents in times of 
crisis and the simultaneous transformation of 
the traditional EU presidency have given a 
fairly widely accepted legitimacy to these 
centralizing tendencies more quickly. The 
dramatic economic circumstances of 2009-
2010 may have eased the major 
transformation of the traditional EU 
presidency. However, the adaptation of the 
EU to its new power structures and working 
methods will require several more years of 
trying and searching. It is obvious that the 
rotating presidency can play an important 
moderating role in this. The Belgian EU 
presidency has tried with some success to 
develop this role, but less constructive 
episodes cannot be excluded in the coming 
years. 
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